On November 19, 1942, Soviet troops at Stalingrad launched a counteroffensive (Operation Uranus) and 4 days later closed the encirclement around the 6th German Army of General Friedrich Paulus operating in the Stalingrad region. Thus, a radical change began in the Great Patriotic War in favor of the Soviet Union. A number of myths are associated with this most important event of the war in Soviet and Russian historiography, which are refuted upon closer acquaintance with the facts.
These are the myths.
First, the Red Army and its commanders, by the time the Stalingrad offensive began, had learned how to fight and acted decisively and skillfully.
Secondly, the strike at Stalingrad was completely unexpected for the Germans, since the preparations for it were kept in absolute secrecy.
Thirdly, this blow was the only main blow of the Red Army in the autumn-winter campaign of 1942.
And finally, fourthly, Marshal Zhukov played a decisive role in planning and carrying out the Stalingrad counteroffensive.
In addition, we like to talk about 91 thousand prisoners captured during the surrender at Stalingrad, but they ignore the question of how many of Paulus's soldiers and officers were able to return home after the war.
How was it really? This is what the special department of the Stalingrad Front reported about the first day of the Soviet counteroffensive (and the most truthful reports about the situation at the front are the reports of special officers, since they were not responsible for the course of hostilities): growth; if it were not for the cloudiness, which did not allow the enemy to widely use aviation, then our units would have suffered heavy losses ... In the 13th mechanized corps, 34 tanks were out of order, 27 of them were blown up by enemy mines. "
It is not surprising that our tankers suffered heavy losses. After all, they had to be guided by the idiotic order of Comrade Stalin of September 19, 1942, which ordered "the tank units of the Field Army, from the moment they approached the battle formations of their infantry, to begin the enemy attack with powerful fire on the move from all tank weapons, both from guns and machine guns, not to be afraid that the shooting will not always turn out aimed. Shooting from tanks on the move should be the main type of fire effect of our tanks on the enemy and, above all, on his main force. " Since stabilizers, which made it possible to conduct targeted firing from tank guns, appeared only in the 50s, Stalin's order doomed tankers to firing into the white world as a pretty penny and a waste of shells.
Nor can it be said that the Germans knew nothing in advance about the Soviet counteroffensive. As the famous Reinhard Gehlen, the famous Reinhard Gehlen, former head of the East Department of the East of the German military intelligence, noted in his memoirs, "On November 4, 1942, an important report was received from the Abwehr. It said:" According to information received from a confidant, on November 4, a meeting of the military council was held under the chairmanship of Stalin, which was attended by twelve marshals and generals ... It was decided to carry out all the planned offensive operations before November 15, as far as weather conditions will allow. The main blows: from Grozny in the direction of Mozdok, in the area of Lower and Upper Mamon in the Don region, near Voronezh, Rzhev, south of Lake Ilmen and near Leningrad. "
There are also references to this report in the works of German and other foreign researchers. Hitler and other leaders of the Wehrmacht were reported on November 7. There would be enough time to withdraw the 6th Army from Stalingrad. In fact, the Soviet troops were originally supposed to go on the offensive at Stalingrad for more early dates(in one of Zhukov's reports to Stalin appears on November 15), and only a delay in the concentration of forces and means forced to postpone its start until November 19. In reality, the Soviet Southwestern Front struck the main blow not on its right wing, near the farmsteads of Verkhniy and Nizhniy Mamon, against the Italians, but on the left wing, against the Romanians. However, it is likely that initially a deeper coverage of the enemy and a strike on the right flank of the Southwestern Front was envisaged, as the unknown agent reported.
Today, most of the documents related to the planning of the Stalingrad counteroffensive remain secret. Therefore, they are absent in the just published two-volume documentary "Battle of Stalingrad" (Moscow: OLMA-Press, 2002). And in any case, a blow from the southwest threatened to cut off the German group at Stalingrad. However, Hitler did not want to withdraw his troops to the Don - this would mean recognizing the collapse of the strategy on the Eastern Front. Moreover, almost until the very day of the counter-offensive, the troops of the 6th Army continued active hostilities in Stalingrad, trying to throw Soviet units into the Volga. This deprived the German command of the opportunity to take at least palliative measures - to transfer part of the 6th Army's divisions from the city to strengthen the flanks defended by much less combat-ready Romanian units.
Marshal Zhukov, in his memoirs, claimed that he developed the idea of a counteroffensive together with Marshal Vasilevsky, and then directly coordinated his preparation. However, in reality, both the preparation and the direct command of the troops at the beginning of the Stalingrad counteroffensive was carried out by Vasilevsky. Zhukov, on the other hand, devoted most of his time to preparing the main attack of the 1942 campaign in the western direction. Reinhard Gehlen on November 6, even before he got acquainted with the report on the meeting in the Kremlin, asserted: "The main direction of future Russian operations ... is increasingly looming in the belt of Army Group Center." on the Don, or they will limit their goals in the south for the reason that they will not be able to achieve success simultaneously in two directions due to lack of forces. In any case, it can be concluded that their preparations for an offensive in the south have not advanced enough to suggest here in in the near future - simultaneously with the expected offensive against Army Group Center - a major operation. "
The chief of German intelligence in the East underestimated the scale and speed of the concentration of Soviet troops in the southern sector of the front. But he was not mistaken that the offensive on the Don would be subsidiary to the offensive in the western direction. This is proved by the distribution of forces and means. The troops of the Western and Kalinin Fronts, which launched Operation Mars under the leadership of Zhukov on November 25, the offensive on Rzhev, numbered 1.9 million people, more than 24 thousand guns and mortars, 3300 tanks and 1100 aircraft, along with reserves in the rear. In the course of the operation, it was planned to defeat Army Group Center and reach the Baltic Sea. At that time, on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, the Don, Stalingrad and Southwestern fronts had only 1.1 million people, 15 thousand guns and mortars, 1400 tanks and more than 900 aircraft. Only after the Zhukov offensive had failed and the strike groups of the Kalinin and Western fronts were surrounded (having lost 1,850 tanks and half a million people, with great difficulty they broke through to their own), the reserves were transferred to the south. The failed operation "Mars" was declared by Zhukov, and after him by Soviet historians, "auxiliary" in relation to the operation "Uranus" - the Stalingrad counteroffensive.
Not everything went smoothly in the course of the further Soviet offensive in the Stalingrad region. I would like to cite here one little-known episode. Beria reported to Stalin: "According to the Special Department of the NKVD of the Stalingrad Front, on the night of December 27, 1942, Major General Larin, a member of the Military Council of the 2nd Guards Army, shot himself in his apartment. Larin left a note with the following content:" moreover. Please do not touch my family. Rodion smart man... Long live Lenin. "Rodion - Commander of the 2nd Guards Army, Comrade Malinovsky. On December 19 of this year, going to the front line of the front, Larin behaved nervously, walked to his full height and was lightly wounded by a bullet in the leg. that he was looking for death "(RGASPI, f. 83, op. 1, d. 19, l. 8).
Ivan Larin's suicide by no means stemmed from the military situation. The 2nd Guards successfully pressed against Manstein's tank group, which was rushing to the rescue of Paulus. Perhaps Larin feared that the special officers would begin to spin the case of Malinovsky's adjutant, Captain Sirenko, who had deserted in August and went with two comrades across the front line to create an independent partisan detachment and fight the Germans. A report on this case was attached to the report of Lavrenty Pavlovich about Larin's suicide. Sirenko left a note where he claimed that “our generals showed themselves to be incapable of command, they were corrupted, drunk, and depraved, like the old libertine General Zhuk (Major General Zhuk was the deputy commander for artillery on the Southern Front and arrived at the front headquarters together with Malinovsky from 6 Army). That the generals carry with them different "wives" and "daughters", but simply carry prostitutes. Having seen all this, he, Sirenko, decided that he should actively fight the Germans for his homeland and decided to join the partisans "(RGASPI , f. 83, op. 1, d. 19, l. 11-12). And in the days of the Stalingrad victory, Soviet generals feared special officers more than Germans.
And in conclusion, it is worth recalling the tragic fate of the German prisoners captured in Stalingrad. Their position turned out to be no better than the position of Soviet prisoners in German camps during the tragic winter of 1941/1942. Of the 91 thousand German prisoners in Stalingrad (according to other sources, there were 110 thousand of them), only 5 thousand people survived. More than half of the survivors were officers: in the officer camps, food was better and more qualified medical care was provided. Tens of thousands of German soldiers died of hunger and epidemics, weakened also by 73 days of malnutrition in the "cauldron". According to the testimony of the few survivors, in the first days of captivity they were often not only not given food, but even the last supplies were taken away. Many also could not stand the exhausting foot marches from the ruins of Stalingrad to the camps. As the German historian Rüdiger Overmans writes, "the overwhelming majority did not see any cruelty in the fact that the guards shot the laggards. It was still impossible to help them, and the shot was considered an act of mercy compared to slow death from the cold." He also admits that many soldiers, being too exhausted, would not have survived in captivity, even if the food was tolerable. Almost 20 thousand "accomplices" - former Soviet prisoners who served in auxiliary positions in the 6th Army - were also killed. They were shot or died in the camps.
On February 2, 2018, Russia celebrates the 75th anniversary of the defeat of the Nazi troops at Stalingrad.
Until now, disputes about the significance of this grandiose battle in world history do not subside, and myths, cliches and outright lies are invariable companions of almost any mention of the Battle of Stalingrad. Let's try to separate the wheat from the chaff?
"FOR PEOPLE WITH STEEL HEARTS"
History cannot be fooled, you cannot turn it back. But you can retouch it in the right color and turn something in the right way. Especially if the Second World War ended long ago, and a new generation has grown up, brought up on Hollywood blockbusters and preferring computer games to documentary historical prose.
At first everything was honest and straightforward. Almost all newspapers, magazines, films and radio broadcasts of the Allied countries after the defeat of the Wehrmacht at Stalingrad spoke the truth. The New York Times of February 7, 1943 reported:
“The final destruction of the remnants of the German army at Stalingrad was the end of a story that will be remembered for generations. In this great war there has never been such a fierce siege and such unyielding resistance. "
Roosevelt then declared: the most significant changes in the Second World War took place in Stalingrad. Churchill sent to the USSR a sword forged by a special decree of King George VI with an engraved inscription: "To people with hearts of steel - the citizens of Stalingrad as a sign of respect for them of the English people."
But later everything changed.
THE MYTH OF LOCAL VALUE
The main lie about Stalingrad, imposed on the world by the West today, is that the battle on the Volga did not play a key role in World War II and was local, says Mikhail Myagkov, scientific director of the Russian Military Historical Society. - Allegedly, the main battle took place in North Africa, in El Alamein. But these military actions are incomparable neither in terms of losses, nor in terms of military efforts.
In fact, about 1 million soldiers participated in the Battle of Stalingrad from the side of the Red Army; they were also opposed by the millionth German-Romanian group. At El Alamein 220 thousand British, French and Greeks fought against 115 thousand Germans and Italians.
From July 1942 to February 1943 in North Africa, the Italo-German block lost in killed and wounded no more than 40 thousand people. During the same time, at least 760 thousand enemy soldiers were put out of action in the area between the Don and Volga rivers.
If the catastrophe at Stalingrad caused a three-day mourning in Germany, like an unprecedented defeat, then the "desert fox" himself, the German Field Marshal Rommel, spoke eloquently about the events near El Alamein: “Neither Hitler nor the General Staff related to the operation in North Africa especially serious. "
SAVING LAND LEASE?
The idea that the supply of weapons by the Allies to the Red Army played a key role in the Battle of Stalingrad is widespread both in the West and in our country. Of course, there is some truth in this statement.
The Allies began to supply military equipment to the USSR in the winter of 1941. And this was a significant aid for the Red Army, exhausted in heavy battles. But the complete truth is that by the beginning of the battle on the Volga, the agreed delivery programs to the USSR were fulfilled by the Americans and the British only by 55%.
In 1941-1942, the USSR received only 7% of the cargo sent from the United States to different countries during the war years. The bulk of weapons and other materials were received by the Soviet Union only in 1944-1945 - after a radical change in the course of the war.
THE TRAGEDY OF PEACEFULS
Of course, not everything that is said about the Battle of Stalingrad in the Western press or in some Russian media is untrue. One of the most difficult pages of Stalingrad is the tragedy of civilians who were not evacuated from the city before the start of the battle.
According to some data, by the summer of 1942, 490 thousand people lived in Stalingrad. From February to May 1942, thousands of evacuated Leningraders were added to them. According to some Volgograd journalists, by the summer of 1942 there were more than 600 thousand people in the city.
According to members of the "Children of Military Stalingrad" society, Stalin did not allow the evacuation of civilians and even children. He believed that Soviet soldiers would fight better, knowing that behind them were the defenseless inhabitants of the city.
According to other sources, there was no official ban on the evacuation, but it began too late. They managed to ferry only 100 thousand people across the Volga. The civilians who remained in the city were killed during the fierce fighting.
SWITCHING TO THE SIDE OF THE VERMACHT
Another of the "inconvenient" pages of the Stalingrad epic is the transfer of a large number of Soviet soldiers to the 6th German Army. According to Western historians Manfred Kerig and Rüdiger Overmans, every fifth soldier in the Paulus army was Russian.
Already in September 1942, when the first German offensive on Stalingrad was stopped, the political departments and departments of the NKVD of the armies near Stalingrad began to receive reports from the front that “former Soviet servicemen” were often fighting against them.
It is believed that at the most dramatic moment of the Stalingrad epic, about 50 thousand Russians went over to the side of the Germans. Most Russian historians believe that this figure is greatly overestimated.
The documents of the 6th Army mention 20 thousand so-called hivis (Hilfswilliger - German for "willing to help"). These are people who were captured and did dirty work in the German troops. The Germans usually did not trust them with weapons.
NO STEP BACK!
On July 28, 1942, Stalin's famous order No. 227 "Not a step back!" Was issued, forbidding retreat without an order, forming penal battalions, as well as barrage detachments, which were allowed to shoot alarmists, deserters and cowards on the spot.
Some historians and publicists believe that it was largely thanks to this order of the Red Army that it was possible to stop the German offensive near Stalingrad. Historian and writer Alexei Isaev, author of the book "Myths and Truth about Stalingrad", believes that the role of the order "Not one step back!" in the Battle of Stalingrad is greatly exaggerated: “The defensive detachments were usually formed not from the NKVD units, but from the cadets of military schools. But there were few of them, and there was no sense in them on the streets of Stalingrad. More often than not, the detachments acted like ordinary rifle subunits. "
Nevertheless, according to official data, by order No. 227, about 13.5 thousand soldiers were shot during the battles in Stalingrad, which corresponds to almost an entire rifle division. The commander of the 62nd Army, Vasily Chuikov, said: "In a burning city, we cannot afford a guard watch for cowards."
One of the curious trends of recent years is the promotion of negative clichés about our history in computer games. Western programmers have already created a whole universe of military battles.
For example, the game based on the events of the Battle of Stalingrad Call of Duty is very popular all over the world, in which three Red Army soldiers are given one rifle and sent to the attack, making them wait until an armed soldier is killed so that his comrades can pick up weapons. The soldiers are being driven into the attack by the detachments of the NKVD, who urge them on with machine-gun bursts and shouts: "Stalin ordered, damn it, just go ahead!"
There is another game - about the Second world war, in which the Red Army does not exist, as if the USSR did not take part in the war against Hitler.
In another popular game, all the exploits of Soviet soldiers are reduced to the execution of deserters, while the Americans land in Normandy and liberate Europe from the Nazis, and the Russians, as always, have nothing to do with it.
Computer games reach hundreds of millions of people, - says the deputy head of the scientific and methodological department of the Victory Museum Sergey Belov, - the data entered into them are replicated all over the world and are projected onto the consciousness of schoolchildren. It is necessary to expand the range of domestic games, to create true stories about the Second World War, in which Russia would be adequately represented.
Elena Khakimova.
RIA Novosti / A. Kapustyansky.
February 2 marks the 75th anniversary of the end of the Battle of Stalingrad, which was marked by the surrender of Field Marshal Paulus's 330,000-strong group, or rather, what was left of it after two months of hunger, shelling and bombing. About 90 thousand people were taken prisoner by the Soviet Union. Germany did not know such a defeat. Stalingrad was the beginning of a radical change in the Great Patriotic War. Remembering this day of Russia's military glory, the editorial staff of the portal publishes an article by Doctor of History Protodeacon Vladimir Vasilik, dedicated to all sorts of myths regarding the Battle of Stalingrad.
MYTH number 1.
The victory at Stalingrad was achieved thanks to Stalin's order No. 227, penal battalions and detachments.
Indeed, after the defeat of our troops near Kharkov in May 1942, the fall of Sevastopol on July 4, 1942 and the abandonment of Rostov, fearing a further retreat and seeking to stabilize the situation, Stalin signed on July 28, 1942 order No. 227, which received the name “Ni step back! " This order called for resistance and condemned the widespread thesis that the vast expanses of the country provide ample opportunities for retreat. The order provided for punitive measures up to execution for abandoning positions and retreating without an order. He demanded that iron discipline be restored. Repressive measures were aimed at stopping the offensive of the Nazis by any means, which could lead to an irreparable catastrophe. This order established penal units and army barrage detachments. On July 30, the order was read out in all divisions and made a tremendous impression, playing an important mobilizing role.
This is how, for example, Konstantin Simonov recalled about the impact of this order on the consciousness of people: "Poems‟ If your house is dear to you "were written by me under the direct impression of Stalin's July order, the meaning of which boiled down to the fact that there is nowhere to retreat, that the enemy must be stopped any, at the most merciless cost, or perish ... Now the movement of life seemed to be some kind of leap in the future - either jump over, or die. "
As noted by a former penal battalion soldier, three times seriously wounded war veteran, major general, failure to take the necessary, sometimes harsh measures in a critical situation can lead to irreparable damage. This is well illustrated by the following example: during a train crash, a young man's foot was clamped between two carriages, and he could not free himself from this grip, but the car was already burning, and the flame was approaching. Suddenly a soldier with a saber was nearby, he grabbed it from its scabbard in order to chop off a clamped and already crushed foot. Those present violently protested and did not allow the military to "cripple" the young man. So he burned down alive along with the car. Isn't this a direct analogy with how our Motherland would have burned down in the fire of the war imposed on us if these harsh measures had not been taken?
However, a legitimate question arises: how really great were the repressions? How much was, for example, punished for desertion during the Battle of Stalingrad? English historian Anthony Beaver speaks of 13,000 executed. In reality, this value is overestimated 12 times: German researcher Joseph Hellbeck in his book “Stalingrad. Memoirs of witnesses and eyewitnesses ”gives much closer to reality data - 668 shot and 1200 sent to penal companies and battalions.
The number of penalties during the Battle of Stalingrad was no more than 1%
It is also a myth that penalties won the victory at Stalingrad. The penalty box himself, an officer of an irreplaceable composition, that is, in fact, a suicide bomber, holder of many military orders A.V. Pyltsyn categorically rejects the idea of the decisive contribution of the penal battalions to the victory in the Great Patriotic War, including the Battle of Stalingrad. He especially notes in his works that the number of penalties during the Battle of Stalingrad was no more than one percent of the total number of Soviet soldiers and officers.
Unfortunately, A.I. Solzhenitsyn, who wrote in the "Gulag Archipelago" about the flow of penalties, whose blood, in his opinion, became the cement for the foundation of the victory at Stalingrad. For this, he received a just rebuke from the hero of the Battle of Stalingrad, commander of the 62nd Army, Marshal Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov:
“I painfully experience the insult you inflicted on us, the people of Stalingrad. I say because I myself experienced 200 fiery days and nights, all the time I was on the right bank of the Volga and in Stalingrad. Perhaps, in your opinion, I, as a penalty box, was appointed to command the 62nd Army, about the merits of which our newspaper Pravda wrote on November 25, 1942: “The petition, which mentions the armies defending Stalingrad, emphasizes the special role of 62 1st Army, which repulsed the main attacks of the Germans on Stalingrad, its commander, Lieutenant General Comrade V.I. Chuikov. and his main assistants vols. Colonel Gorokhov, Major General Rodimtsev, Major General Guryev, Colonel Balvinov, Colonel Gurtyev, etc. " In your opinion, Solzhenitsyn, it turns out that the guards divisions were “cemented” by penal companies ?! Is it possible that the sniper fighter Vasily Zaitsev, who destroyed about 300 fascists, Sergeant Yakov Pavlov and the group of fighters of different nationalities led by him, who defended the house for 58 days and nights, which the Nazis never took, but put more corpses around this house than when the French the capital of Paris - were these good defenders of Stalingrad “cemented” by penal companies? Was the glorious son of the Spanish people, Ruben Ibarruri, a penalty box or “cemented” by penalty boxers? You, Solzhenitsyn, dared to scoff at these heroes. "
According to the well-grounded opinion of the modern German researcher Josef Hellbeck, there was simply no work for the detachments: the fighters had sufficient motivation and the will to resist. The heroes of Stalingrad mentioned by Marshal Chuikov are vivid examples of this.
MYTH number 2.
It flows from the first. Allegedly, Soviet soldiers were a faceless mass, poorly armed and trained, and won only by numbers.
"Here we must conquer every meter of the earth in hard battles."
Again, this is refuted by the aforementioned exploits of Vasily Zaitsev, Yakov Pavlov, Ruben Ibarruri and hundreds of others. But let's cite the testimonies of the enemies, written not after the war, but on the spot, from the trenches of Stalingrad:
“Equipped with the most modern weapons, the Russian inflicts the most severe blows on us. This is most clearly manifested in the battles for Stalingrad. Here we must conquer every meter of the earth in hard battles and make great sacrifices, since the Russian fights stubbornly and fiercely, until his last breath ... " (From a letter from corporal Otto Bauer, p / n 43396 B, to Hermann Kuge. 18 November 1942).
“... Stalingrad is hell on earth, Verdun, red Verdun, with new weapons. We attack daily. If we manage to take 20 meters in the morning, the Russians throw us back in the evening ... " (From a letter from corporal Walter Opperman, p / n 44111, brother November 18, 1942).
At the beginning of the Battle of Stalingrad, the numerical advantage was with the Germans.
“... When we came to Stalingrad, there were 140 of us, and by September 1, after two weeks of fighting, only 16 remained. All the rest were wounded and killed. We do not have a single officer, and a non-commissioned officer was forced to take command of the unit. Every day up to a thousand wounded are taken out of Stalingrad to the rear. As you can see, we have considerable losses ... " (From a letter from the soldier Heinrich Malkhus, p / n 17189, to corporal Karl Weitzel. 13.XI.1942).
“… During the day, you cannot show yourself from behind the shelters, otherwise you will be shot like a dog. The Russian has a sharp and sharp eye. There were once 180 of us, only 7. Machine gunners No. 1 were 14 before, now there are only two ... " (From a letter from machine gunner Adolf to his mother. 18.XI.1942).
As for the number, it should be noted that at the beginning and in the middle of the Battle of Stalingrad, the numerical advantage was with the Germans. Attacking at the end of July, the formations of the 6th Army of Paulus numbered 270 thousand against 160 thousand Soviet soldiers, 3000 guns and mortars against 2200 Soviet, 500 tanks against 400 Soviet. And even at the beginning of the offensive operation "Uranus" on November 19, 1942, the superiority of the Soviet troops was minimal: in personnel - 1.1 to 1, guns and mortars - 1.5 to 1, in tanks - 2.2 to 1, in aviation - 1.1 to 1. Meanwhile, to conduct large-scale offensive operations, military science requires a fourfold superiority in manpower and technology. This proves that already during the Battle of Stalingrad we fought not by numbers, but by skill.
Myth number 3.
The Germans, who experienced the horrors of the blockade, were innocent victims of both regimes - Hitler's and Stalin's, equally responsible for the war.
It was such a false concept that led to the speech of the Urengoy boy Nikolai Denisov in the Bundestag, in which he mourns the fate of the poor German prisoners of war.
And how many of them themselves felt about the fate that had befallen? As for just retribution and God's judgment. Here are some more excerpts from the letters:
“… Yes, here you have to thank God for every hour that you stay alive. No one here will escape their destiny. The worst thing is that you have to wait resignedly until your hour comes. Either by an ambulance train to their homeland, or an immediate and terrible death to the other world. Only a few, lucky ones chosen by God will happily survive the war at the front near Stalingrad ... " (From a letter from the soldier Paul Boltse to Maria Smud. 18.XI.1942).
19 november... If we lose this war, we will be avenged for everything we have done. Thousands of Russians and Jews were shot with their wives and children near Kiev and Kharkov. It's just incredible. But this is precisely why we must exert all our strength to win the war.
5 January... Our division has a cemetery near Stalingrad, where over 1000 people are buried. That's just terrible. The people who are now sent from transport units to the infantry can be considered condemned to death.
January 15... There is no way out of the boiler and there will never be. From time to time, mines burst around us ... " (From the diary of officer F.P. of the 8th light rifle and machine gun fleet of the 212nd regiment.).
By the way, the last letter explains the fierce resistance that the Germans showed even in the Stalingrad cauldron. It is explained by propaganda, which suggested that "subhuman" Russians do not know mercy, as well as the fear of retribution for the crimes actually committed, which were more than enough. The aforementioned thousands of shot Russians and Jews near Kiev are just the tip of the iceberg. One execution in Babi Yar on September 30, 1941 - 100 thousand people. In Crimea, the Germans and their accomplices, the Crimean Tatars, killed 50,000 Crimean Jews, not to mention many ordinary Soviet citizens. In Simferopol, during the occupation, 22828 civilians and Soviet prisoners of war were shot, tortured or driven into slavery, in Sevastopol - 69866 people, in Yalta - 11707, in Kerch - 43429, Evpatoria - 12598, Feodosia - 11,300 people, etc. ...
In Odessa, Romanians and Germans killed about 140 thousand inhabitants.
But what happened at Stalingrad or in Stalingrad itself! Here is just one act of the Commission for the Investigation of the Atrocities of the German-Fascist Invaders, dedicated to the terrible Dulag No. 205, where, according to various sources, from 6,000 to 15,000 prisoners of war and civilians of Stalingrad died:
“After the liberation of the village of Alekseevka, Gorodishchensky district, by the Red Army on January 22, a prisoner of war camp was discovered in its vicinity, designated by the German command as No. 205. Here, behind barbed wire, in dark and cramped holes dug in the open steppe, by the time the Soviet troops contained 950 prisoners of war, of which some are civilians of the city of Stalingrad. The overwhelming majority of the prisoners were so weak from hunger, beatings, exhaustion, and overwork that they were unable to move without assistance.
Here's how the civilian population was treated:
“Below is published an act on the atrocities of the German fascist scoundrels in the village of Skosyr, Rostov region:‟ Before retreating from the village, the Germans committed a massacre of the civilian population. Hitler's bandits shot a 6th grade high school student Grigory Pashutin, hospital employee Leonid Perepelkin, tractor driver Christopher Shilov, collective farm chairman Yegor Kharitonov, disabled Nikanor Lyutin, Alexander Shirokoradenko, Andrey Shilov, Alexander Semenov and others. There were sick Soviet citizens in the local hospital. Fascist monsters drove them to the river and shot them. Some of the patients could not move and remained in the hospital. The Nazis burned down the hospital along with the sick citizens who were in it ”. The act was signed by: captain Mitrofanov, captain Kovtunov, military assistant Tkalenko, junior lieutenant Kolesnikov, residents of the village of Skosyrskaya M. Kharitonova, M. Voronina, A. Shevchenko, S. Voronina and L. Shilova. (Sovinformburo)
I believe that after such descriptions, many will not want to feel sorry for the unfortunate Germans, and even more so to equate them with our Red Army soldiers, who treated captured Germans in a completely different way. They were not kept outdoors, they were given normal working rations. Unfortunately, this did not save many who had reached extreme exhaustion. Of the 90 thousand prisoners at Stalingrad, 27 thousand died from dystrophy. However, measures were taken, 35 thousand prisoners of war were sent to cure and put on increased allowance. After 1949, about 60 thousand Stalingrad prisoners returned to Germany. Many German prisoners of war about the Soviet captivity retained the warmest memories, incomparable with what our captured soldiers and officers faced with the Germans.
And, finally, many German prisoners of war rightly considered their own leadership to be the cause of all their troubles, which refused to accept the offer of surrender and doomed their soldiers to senseless death. Here's just one example:
“Everyone on the battery - 49 people - read the Soviet ultimatum leaflet. At the end of the reading, I told my comrades that we are doomed people and that the ultimatum presented to Paulus was a lifeline thrown at us by a generous adversary ... " (From the testimony of the captive Martin Gander).
“… I read the ultimatum, and a burning anger against our generals boiled up in me. They, apparently, decided to finally ditch us in this damn place. Let the generals and officers fight themselves. Enough for me. I'm fed up with the war ... " (From the testimony of the captured corporal Joseph Schwartz, 10th company of the 131st infantry regiment of the 44th infantry division. II.I.1943).
MYTH number 4.
Stalingrad was allegedly just one of the "key places" of the Second World War.
Comparison of the battle of Stalingrad and El Alamein looks simply indecent
In order to justify the inaction of Britain and the United States in 1941-1943 and inflate their very modest contribution to the Victory over fascism, the concept of the so-called "key places" of the Second World War was developed in English and American historiography, which supposedly decided its outcome. In this concept, the Battle of Stalingrad was miraculously equated with the battle of El Alamein in Egypt in October 1942, because if, as a result of Stalingrad, Hitler was unable to break through to the Volga and, accordingly, further south and east, then as a result of the battles at El Alamein Alamein, he could not reach the Suez Canal and capture Palestine. Of course, if the salvation of Palestine is considered the main result of the Second World War, then the Anglo-Saxon historians are right. However, it is clear to any sane person that its main result is the defeat of the Third Reich and its allies and the deliverance of the world from the fascist plague. From this point of view, the comparison of the Battle of Stalingrad and El Alamein looks simply indecent. Let's look at at least some data. So, at Stalingrad at the time of the offensive from our side, about 1 million soldiers, equipped with 15 thousand guns and rocket launchers, participated. They were also opposed by the millionth German-Romanian group, which had more than 10 thousand guns and large-caliber mortars. At El Alamein, 220 thousand British, French and Greek with 2359 guns fought against 115 thousand Germans and Italians, who were armed with 1219 artillery barrels. From July 1942 to February 1943, the Italian-German bloc lost no more than 40 thousand people killed and wounded in North Africa. During the same time, at least 760 thousand enemy soldiers were put out of action in the area between the Don and Volga rivers. These data are cited by Western researchers themselves. The heads of the allied powers themselves were well aware of the very modest nature of their efforts and paid tribute to the Soviet Union and the heroes of the Battle of Stalingrad. This is what F.D. Roosevelt:
“On behalf of the peoples of the United States of America, I present this letter to the city of Stalingrad to celebrate our admiration for its valiant defenders, whose courage, fortitude and dedication during the siege from September 13, 1942 to January 31, 1943, will forever inspire the hearts of all free people. .. ".
And Churchill quite openly called the battles for El Alamein "a pinprick." Hitler had a similar attitude to the war in North Africa. Marshal Rommel remarked: "In Berlin, the campaign in North Africa was of secondary importance, and neither Hitler nor the General Staff took it particularly seriously." Meanwhile, the Battle of Stalingrad was indeed the beginning of a radical turning point in the war. The victory in it plunged Germany into mourning, kept Japan and Turkey from entering the war with the USSR, forced many German allies to look for ways to a separate peace. And finally, she inspired all people of good will to fight fascism.
Remembering the Battle of Stalingrad, we reflect on the path of God's Providence
Remembering the Battle of Stalingrad, we ponder the path of the Providence of God. The Lord led and is leading Russia through trials, falls and rebirth, just as He led the Old Testament Israel. The terrible military catastrophe of 1941 and the defeats of 1942 gave way to great victories that had no analogues in world history. All this, of course, is associated with an incredible, terrible feat. Soviet people, great military and labor efforts. But we must remember who is the source of strength, courage and wisdom. In the Battle of Stalingrad and, more broadly, in the Great Patriotic War, with His mercy to Russia and the trial of the occult Reich, the Lord told us: "It was from Me."
In conclusion, we quote the words of a participant in the Great Patriotic War, her hero, the great old man, who recently passed away:
“This great terrible Patriotic war, of course, was the result of God's allowance for our deviation from God, for our moral, moral violation of the law of God and for the fact that in Russia they tried to put an end to religion, faith, and the Church altogether. This was the enemy's plan: for complete atheism to reign everywhere.
The Lord foresaw these enemy plans, and in order not to allow their implementation, the Lord allowed the war. Not by chance. And we see that the war really converted people to faith, and the rulers treated the Church in a completely different way. Especially when Stalin's decree came out on the opening of churches in Russia. This undoubtedly moved the mercy of God to our country, to our Church, to our people. Humanly, of course, we can say that the high military spirit of our soldiers won. And we must pay tribute to the country's leadership, which erected such a genius commander like Zhukov. In former times the Lord raised up Suvorov and Kutuzov for Russia. In our time, Georgy Zhukov was the grace of God. We owe him our salvation.
Immediately, our military equipment rose, strengthened and improved. Humanly, we all attribute this to the fact that people united and worked successfully on the front line and in the rear. It is right. But the Lord gave them strength, energy and intelligence.
When I read the memoirs of Marshal Zhukov, I was struck by the moment where he writes about how he was amazed at the beginning of the war by the genius of the strategic plans of German generals. Then he wondered at the mistakes and miscalculations that they later made. For his part, Zhukov says this. For my part, I will say: all this was done by the Wisdom of God! The Lord, whom he wants to punish, always deprives of reason, intelligence ... And the same person who at first showed wisdom when the grace of God receded, makes mistakes.
When the Lord had already decided to give help to our people, our army, He darkened the minds of the fascists, and gave our military leaders wisdom, military ingenuity, courage and success. The Lord gave strength, energy, intelligence to our designers and engineers in order to win. As the saying goes: "Without God - not to the threshold!"
The trouble is that we do not see the providence of God and do not give glory to the Lord for showing such providence, such care. It is sad...
As a matter of fact, after all, Russia has risen from nothingness, has grown to a great power only by the grace of God, only by the power of God, miracles ... And no one wants to say about this. "
Indeed, most often they prefer to remain silent about this. But we must speak about it in full voice. Especially now, in our difficult time, in many ways reminiscent of the pre-war period. So that Russia again grows to a great power, and we - to the extent of those great people who suffered the Victory given to us by God ...
In the days of the 75th anniversary of the Battle of Stalingrad, which became a turning point in the course of the Great Patriotic War, it is time to recall some common judgments about this battle and compare them with known facts. The degree of reliability and validity of these judgments, as we shall see, will be different.
First: at Stalingrad, the German army suffered the largest defeat in its history.
This is true only in relation to those battles of the Second World War that took place before Stalingrad, the battles of the First World War and the wars of the 19th century, except for Napoleonic ones. According to the German general K. Tippelskirch, near Stalingrad "something incomprehensible happened, not experienced since 1806 - the death of the army surrounded by the enemy." In 1806, in the battles of Jena and Auerstedt, the Prussian army was completely destroyed by the French army of Napoleon. Before the catastrophe at Stalingrad, the Germans never experienced anything like this again. But after Stalingrad, such and even larger defeats of the German troops ceased to be an exception.
Second: at Stalingrad, the Soviet army carried out the largest operation in the world history of wars to encircle enemy troops.
This is not true, since before Stalingrad the Germans had repeatedly carried out successful operations to encircle and destroy much larger groupings of Soviet troops. In the first week of the Great Patriotic War near Minsk, the troops of two armies of the Soviet Western Front were surrounded, and the Germans alone took more than 300 thousand people. In the fall of 1941, during operations first near Kiev, then near Vyazma and Bryansk, the Germans each time managed to capture more than 650 thousand Soviet soldiers and officers. The total number of the grouping of German, Romanian and Croatian troops surrounded at Stalingrad was, according to modern estimates, 280 thousand people.
Third: Hitler strove to take Stalingrad by all means because of its name.
In the plans of the German command for 1942, primary attention was paid to the capture of the Caucasus. After the fighting in early July, it considered it possible to take Stalingrad with the forces of one 6th Army and reoriented the 4th Panzer Army to the Caucasian direction as well. Only at the end of August 1942, it transferred it back to the Stalingrad direction. Hitler justified his desire to seize Stalingrad, against the backdrop of a failed offensive in the Caucasus, by the fact that the main route for the transportation of Caucasian oil allegedly runs along the Volga. However, many commanders of the Wehrmacht after the war explained Hitler's stubbornness in the capture of this city precisely by the magic of its name. Before the start of the Soviet offensive, many of them suggested that Hitler withdraw his troops from Stalingrad to the line of the lower Don in advance, to which he did not agree.
Fourth: the Germans during the offensive on Stalingrad significantly outnumbered the Soviet troops in the number of forces and means.
Unfortunately, even in the summer of 1942, the Soviet command has not always and not everywhere learned the lessons from the defeats of the previous year and was inferior to the enemy in the ability to use the materiel. Before the start of the battle in the big bend of the Don at the end of July 1942, 300 thousand soldiers of the 62nd and 64th Soviet armies acted against 270 thousand soldiers and officers of the 6th German army, against 3400 enemy guns and mortars - 5000 Soviet, against 400 German tanks - 1000 Soviet.
July 26 I.V. Stalin and Chief of the General Staff A.M. Vasilevsky sent a telegram to the command of the Stalingrad Front expressing indignation at his actions: “The front has a threefold advantage in tanks, absolute predominance in aviation [that was true - Ya. B.]. If desired and skill, it was possible to smash the enemy to smithereens. " Meanwhile, in the course of their unsuccessfully executed counterattack, the troops of the front lost 450 tanks in just three days, that is, almost half of their total number.
Fifth: The Stalingrad direction was the main one in the winter campaign of 1942/43.
The bulk of both Soviet and German troops by the winter of 1942/43 was concentrated, as the data on their numbers show, in the central direction, west of Moscow. And the main operation of the Red Army in the winter campaign was planned exactly there - near Rzhev and Vyazma. However, it ended in failure. At Stalingrad, however, Soviet troops managed to make a strategic breakthrough of the enemy's front. This led to the shift of the center of gravity of subsequent operations to the south.
Sixth: there was no point in stubborn defense of Stalingrad; Soviet troops only suffered large, unjustified losses there.
By November 1942, the completely destroyed Stalingrad was not an economically important object. But he was in an important strategic position. Full mastery of it would allow the Germans to withdraw a significant mass of troops from Stalingrad to the rear. In this case, Stalingrad could not have played the role of a strategic trap for the German army, and the Soviet troops would not have been able to win such a significant victory under it. In addition, the capture of Stalingrad by the Germans, renowned by their propaganda to the whole world, would undoubtedly greatly raise their morale and, at the same time, reduce that of the Soviet troops and people. The magic of the name of the city played a role not only for the Nazi, but also for the Soviet leadership. But it was Napoleon who deduced such a formula that in war the moral factor correlates with the material one in a ratio of three to one.
Seventh: if the Germans took Stalingrad, Japan and Turkey would go to war against the Soviet Union.
Although there were no clear plans or obligations of Japan and / or Turkey to start a war against the USSR in this case, the factor of such a possibility was taken into account by the Soviet leadership and undoubtedly played some role in the determination to defend Stalingrad to the last.
Eighth: the Germans had the opportunity to withdraw the army of Paulus from the encirclement and save it from death, but for some unknown reason they did not do this.
When, in mid-December 1942, the tank group of General Goth covered two-thirds of the distance separating it from the 6th Army surrounded at Stalingrad, Paulus could only break through to meet it. The opinions of memoirists and historians as to why the order for a breakthrough was not issued differ. Some blame Paulus's indecision for everything, others - Field Marshal Manstein, commander of Army Group Don, and others - Hitler. Some argue that Hitler forbade Paulus to break through and specifically sacrificed the 6th Army in order to create a symbol of heroic resistance out of it (it is not clear, then, however, why he organized a deblocking strike).
Most likely, the Germans were waiting for the troops of Goth to approach the encircled units even closer in order to act with confidence. But the stubborn resistance of the Soviet troops (this episode of the war is described in the famous novel Hot Snow by Yu. Bondarev) thwarted these calculations. As a result, as it turned out later, the Germans irretrievably missed the most favorable moment for the oncoming breakthrough.
Ruins of Stalingrad. February 1943
It was the bloodiest battle in World War II. She was so cruel that the Soviet Union hid the truth. The mystery has now been revealed.
Time: January 31, 1943 Location: the basement of a department store destroyed by shells in the Soviet city of Stalingrad. But it was not the unhappy and haggard faces of the Nazis that engraved in the memory of the Soviet Red Army soldiers when they opened an underground hole in which the exhausted commanders of Adolf Hitler took refuge.
“Waste, human excrement and who knows what else has accumulated there up to the waist,” recalled Major Anatoly Zoldatov. - The stench was incredible. There were two toilets, and over both hung signs saying "No entry for Russians."
Incredibly terrible, but legendary and decisive, the Battle of Stalingrad has just ended in a terrible and humiliating defeat of Hitler's 6th Army. In a little over a couple of years, Nazi Germany surrenders.
Lieutenant Colonel Leonid Vinokur was the first to notice the commander of the German troops lying in the corner with awards on his chest. “When I entered, he was lying on the bed. He lay there in an overcoat and a cap. He had two weeks of stubble on his cheeks, and he seemed to have lost all his courage, ”Vinokur recalled. This commander was Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus.
The stories of participants in the Battle of the Volga, during which 60,000 German soldiers and from 500,000 to a million Red Army soldiers were killed, are part of a collection of previously unknown conversations with Russian soldiers in Stalingrad. These materials were first published in the form of the book "Stalingrad Protocols", which was prepared for publication by the German historian Jochen Hellbeck. He gained access to several thousand recordings of interviews with Red Army soldiers who fought in World War II. These records are kept in the archives of the Soviet Academy of Sciences in Moscow.
The stories of the participants, which were initially planned to be included in the chronicle of the "Great Patriotic War" of the Soviet Union, are so frank and full of terrible details that the Kremlin after 1945 published only a small part of them, preferring the generally accepted version from the arsenal of Stalinist propaganda. These "protocols" lay idle in the Moscow archives until 2008, when Hellbeck was prompted to gain access to 10,000 pages of these documents.
From the stories of the participants it follows that one of the main motives of the fierce counteroffensive of the Red Army was the cruelty and bloodthirstiness of the occupying German army. Soviet sniper Vasily Zaitsev told his interlocutor: "You see young girls, children hanged from trees in the park - it has a tremendous impact."
Major Pyotr Zayonchkovsky said that he found the body of his deceased comrade, who was tortured by the Nazis: “The skin and nails on his right hand were completely torn off. The eye was burned out, and there was a wound from a red-hot piece of iron on the left temple. The right half of his face was covered with a flammable liquid and burned. "
First-hand stories are also reminiscent of the terrible trials that befell both sides in the hardest and most grueling street fighting, when they fought for every house. Sometimes it turned out that the soldiers of the Red Army occupied one floor of the building, while the Germans held the other. “In street battles, grenades, machine guns, bayonets, knives and shovels are used,” recalled Lieutenant General Chuikov. - They stand face to face and hammer each other. The Germans can't stand it. "
From the point of view of history, these protocols have great importance because they raise doubts about the claims of the Nazis, later taken up by the opponents of the Soviet Union in the cold war, that the soldiers of the Red Army fought so decisively only because otherwise they would have been shot by the Soviet secret police.
British historian Anthony Beevor, in his book Stalingrad, claims that 13,000 Soviet soldiers were shot during the Battle of Stalingrad. He also notes that more than 50 thousand Soviet citizens fought on the side of the German troops in Stalingrad alone. However, Soviet documents obtained by Hellbeck indicate that by mid-October 1942, that is, three and a half months before the defeat of the Nazis, fewer than 300 people had been shot.
It is possible that some of the interviews were given solely for the purpose of Soviet propaganda. This question remains open. From conversations with political workers, it follows that they played an important role in the battle, inspiring soldiers to fight. Political instructors said that in the midst of the battle they handed out leaflets to the soldiers, which spoke of the "hero of the day." "It was considered a shame if the communist did not go in the front ranks and did not lead the soldiers into battle," Brigadier Commissar Vasiliev recalled.
Hellbuk notes in his minutes that in the period from August to October 1942, the number of CPSU members in Stalingrad increased from 28.5 thousand to 53.5 thousand people, and that the Red Army was confident of its political and moral superiority over the Nazis. "The Red Army was a political army," the historian told Spiegel magazine.
However, Stalingrad cost dearly even those victorious heroes of the Red Army who managed to survive in this most bloody battle of World War II. Vasily Zaitsev, who claimed to have killed 242 Germans, was the best army sniper. “You have to remember a lot, and memory has a powerful effect,” he said a year later, before the term PTSD was invented. “Now my nerves are shattered, and I am constantly trembling.” Other survivors of Stalingrad committed suicide years later.
"The Independent", UK
Delivery of military cargo to the Stalingrad area. 1942 year
Street fight in Stalingrad. September 1942
Fight in one of the shops of the Krasny Oktyabr plant. December 1942
The killed Germans. Stalingrad area, winter 1943