The troops of the Voronezh Front continued to improve until July 5, that is, until the day the German offensive began. Particular attention was paid to the construction of battalion areas and defense centers. The basis of each defensive line was company strongholds with a widely developed system of trenches and communications. They were an effective means of providing maneuver with fire and manpower with the maximum use of the terrain to organize strong and easily controlled fire in front of the front line and in depth.
It should be noted that the preparation of the main line of defense in engineering terms was carried out by the forces of military units, and the second and rear army lines - by the forces of the troops and the local population. The construction and equipment of the front lines were carried out by the departments of defensive construction (UOS) with the involvement of the forces and means of the local population.
Larisa VASILIEVA, Igor ZHELTOV“In sight - Prokhorovka”
For many years in the history of Nizhny Novgorod there was no one of the main pages. It was marked "Top Secret". This is a page about how modern weapons were forged in the city and region. Today, the classification of secrecy has been removed from the Nizhny Novgorod arsenal. This book is one of the first attempts to cover the history of the creation of weapons that became famous on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War and in peacetime.
The book contains unique materials from declassified archives and memories of those who created the weapon and those who owned it.
Let's not forget that after the end of the Great Patriotic War there was a military confrontation called " cold war”, which also required weapons. And this war was won. Nizhny Novgorod residents also put their laboring hands to it.
Much of what is told in this book, you will learn for the first time.
line of defense
line of defense
Now we can firmly say that during the war years Gorky was a rear city. We know almost nothing about the fate that the command of the Wehrmacht determined for him, the offensive impulse of which ended near Moscow. One can only guess that the enemy would not have limited himself to the capture of Moscow. But how far would he go and what were his plans? We know very little about this. And could it be considered that Gorky would remain a rear city?
December 18, 1940. Hitler's headquarters. Plan Barbarossa signed. Initially, however, the invasion operation had a different name - "Fritz". Hitler considered it colorless and remembered the Kaiser of the Holy Roman Empire Frederick I, nicknamed Barbarossa ("Red Beard"). He was one of the leaders of the Third Crusade to the Holy Land. True, he did not reach the goal: he fell off his horse at one of the crossings and drowned. The legend, however, revived him and transferred him to the Küffhäuser mountains, towering in the geographical center of Germany, where he was waiting for the country to call him.
Every schoolboy in Germany had to know Barbarossa. In the mountains, in the Cave of Barbarossa, where schoolchildren made a pilgrimage, there was a marble statue of him.
And so, the time of such a tedious waiting for the Kaiser ended eight centuries after his death. Choosing such a pompous name, Hitler assured General Franz Halder: "When Barbarossa begins, the world will hold its breath in silence."
The introductory part of the plan stated:
“The German armed forces must be ready to crush Soviet Russia ... To this end, the army must use all available military units with the exception of those that remain in the occupied territory ...
Preparations must be completed by May 15, 1941. The greatest effort must be made to disguise the intention to launch an attack.
The ultimate goal of the operation is to create a defensive line against Asiatic Russia along the Volga River to Arkhangelsk. Then the last industrial region left in Russia in the Urals can be destroyed by the forces of the Luftwaffe.
The purpose of the war is defined. Many cities of the Soviet Union are doomed to destruction. But did the Barbarossa plan provide for the assault and capture of Gorky? Judging by the proposed border of surrender, it was envisaged.
In the diary of the Chief of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht, Franz Halder, the first discussion of the plan for the invasion was recorded in July 1940. It is known that six variants of the plan were proposed for consideration, in which the direction of the main attack varied.
The third option, authored by Major General Erich Marx, assumed the main blow from East Prussia and Northern Poland to Moscow with access to Gorky, an auxiliary one to Leningrad, and a secondary one to the south.
Hitler intended to execute a plan of attack on Soviet Union for five months. According to the third option, Erich Marx proposed to do away with the soviets in 9-17 weeks.
The irony of history - there was another Marx. And if the first called for the construction of mythical communism, then the second had predatory views of the country in which they tried to build this communism.
The historical rank of Major General Erich Marx, of course, was lower than his namesake and served as chief of staff of the 18th Army. He saw the concept of his strike as "the defeat of the Soviet armed forces in order to make it impossible for the revival of Russia as an enemy of Germany in the foreseeable future."
The general saw the industrial power of the Soviet Union in Ukraine, in the Donets Basin, Moscow and Leningrad, and the industrial zone to the east of these regions "did not matter."
The views of the general largely determined the entire course of hostilities in the East.
Along with the invasion plan, another plan was being developed - "Ost". The first branch of the Reichs Main Security Directorate ("Gestapo") expressed its views on Soviet people. The original text of the plan has never been found, but preliminary studies have been preserved.
To solve the eastern problem, it was proposed "the complete destruction of the Russian people or the Germanization of that part of it that has clear signs of the Nordic race."
Hitler's wishes were also taken into account, which he repeatedly expressed: “If we teach Russians, Ukrainians and Kyrgyz to read and write, then later this will turn against us. Education will give the advanced among them the opportunity to study history, master historical experience, and from here to develop political ideas that cannot but be detrimental to our interests ... It is impossible that they know more than the meaning of road signs. Education in the field of geography can be limited to one single phrase: "The capital of the Reich is Berlin." Mathematics and everything else like that is completely unnecessary.
Preparing for an attack on the Soviet Union, the Nazis stocked up with another plan - "Oldenburg". It envisaged a large-scale economic robbery of our country.
A month after the start of the war, Hitler will take care: “...Now we are faced with the task of cutting the territory of this huge pie in the way we need, in order to be able: firstly, to dominate it, secondly, to manage it, secondly, third, to exploit it.”
The "pie" was divided in advance into commissariats. We were to live in the Muscovy commissariat, which included Tula, Kazan, Ufa, Sverdlovsk, Kirov and Gorky. It was one of the seven general commissariats. Hitler repeatedly said that the words "Russia", "Russian", "Russian" must be forever destroyed and banned from their use, replacing the terms "Moscow", "Muscovite", "Moscow". It was supposed to use the territory of "Muscovy" as a place of accumulation of elements undesirable for Germany from various areas controlled by the Germans, and to put the entire economy of this area at the service of only the interests of Germany.
"Scientists" Nazis prepared and handed Hitler a "voluminous work", which stated that it was the Germans who, long before our era, traveling from the Black to the Baltic Sea, brought culture there and maintained order. Moreover, they allegedly founded Novgorod and Kiev…
November 6, 1941. Moscow, Mayakovskaya metro station. Almost simultaneously, trains approach the platform from both sides. People come out of one and sit down in rows of chairs installed on the platform. In another train, Stalin arrived with the Kremlin retinue.
The presiding officer opened the solemn meeting dedicated to the 24th anniversary of the October Revolution and gave the floor to the leader.
9 p.m. The report was broadcast on the radio. Stalin spoke calmly and reservedly. He substantiated the inconsistency of the "blitzkrieg" plan and expressed firm confidence in our final victory over the enemy. He called the German army "men with the morality of beasts."
And, summing up his speech, he said: "If they want to get a war of annihilation, they will get it."
There were words in Stalin's speech that were perceived as an order:
“There is only one means necessary to reduce to zero the superiority of the Germans in tanks and thereby radically improve the position of our army. It, this means, consists not only in sharply increasing the production of anti-tank aircraft, anti-tank rifles and guns, anti-tank rifles and mortars, it is necessary to build more anti-tank ditches and all kinds of other anti-tank obstacles.
This is the task now.
We can accomplish this task, and we can accomplish it by all means!”
The anti-tank ditches that Stalin spoke of were one of the most impressive obstacles in the way of the Nazi tank armadas. In the first days of the war, thousands of kilometers of defensive lines were erected along the Dnieper and Berezina. The rapid maneuver of the German tanks was halted by ditches on the way to the Donets Basin. They surrounded Leningrad with a moat. Work was carried out at an accelerated pace in the Stalingrad area.
The orders of the State Defense Committee included the cities of Yaroslavl, Ivanovo, Rybinsk, Gorky, Saratov.
But on October 16, the Gorky Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted a resolution on the construction of defensive structures around the city. The appeal to the residents of the city and the region said:
“... The city of Gorky and the region, which are one of the major industrial and cultural centers of the country, are now in the near rear. We are not in immediate danger, but the people of Gorky must be ready at any moment for all sorts of surprises and accidents.
The construction of field fortifications, begun around the city of Gorky, is of great national importance. It is the business of every worker in the region.
Comrade workers, employees, collective farmers, students and housewives - participants in the construction of field fortifications!
You are making a valuable contribution to strengthening the security of your beloved city, rich in heroic past and present, named after the glorious name of the immortal Gorky.
Put all your energy and skill into construction, take an example from heroic defenders Odessa, Leningrad and Moscow!
Build fortifications in a front-line manner, so that the city of Gorky becomes an impregnable stronghold for the enemy.
On one day alone, 11,022 Sormovichi residents received mobilization orders for the construction of a defense line.
Each mobilized person was supposed to arrive at the assembly point warmly dressed and have a spare change of linen, a towel, mittens, a bowler hat or bowl, a mug, a spoon, a mattress pillowcase, a blanket and food for three days. It was also desirable to have your own tool to choose from: a shovel, crowbar, saw, ax.
From villages and villages wagon trains stretched. They went to the trenches.
And yet, was the capture of the city of Gorky by German troops real? Were the jobs that distracted thousands of people from more important matters reinsurance?
In the plans of the Nazi command, Gorky did not often flash. In the diary of the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, Colonel General Franz Halder, the mention of the city of Gorky first appears in an entry dated November 19, 1941.
“13.00. Report from the Fuhrer (statement and wish of Hitler). Analysis of the situation at the front ...
... Tasks for the next (1942) year. First of all - the Caucasus. The goal is access to the southern Russian border. Deadline - March-April. In the north - depending on the results of the operation this year. Mastering Vologda or Gorky. The deadline is the end of May.
A strike by all types of troops was supposed. Aviation is already actively bombing Gorky and is doing it very effectively. Several important workshops of the automobile plant were destroyed. Completely, from a direct hit by a bomb, the leadership of the radiotelephone plant was killed. Bombers are still flying at the limit of what is possible - far. Returning, the crews of reconnaissance aircraft report that intensive earthworks are being observed over a large area, presumably, an anti-tank ditch is being built. The Russians are preparing to meet the tanks...
One thing is striking, why the anti-tank ditch was built not from the side of Moscow, from where a breakthrough to Gorky was possible, but from the opposite side, from the side of Arzamas. Traces of this moat are still visible today. It can be found in Tatinets on the Volga, in the Dalnekonstantinovsky and Sosnovsky districts, near the village of Oranok, Bogorodsky district. It went out to the Oka at Gorbatov, continued on the other side of the river and went out again to the Volga at Katunok. In addition, from Murom, he walked along the entire bank of the Oka. As a result, the total length of the moat was 1134 kilometers.
Who was waiting for this ditch, whose tanks?
Now it can already be assumed that the Soviet command knew about the plans of the German troops. And not even in general terms, but in subtleties, when the mention of Arzamas appeared in the plans of the Nazi command. At the same time, the direction of one of the main blows was determined, even if Moscow was not taken: Ryazan - Murom - Gorky.
The person who was supposed to lead the troops in this direction is also known - the "tank king" Heinz Guderian. With his 2nd shock army, he pierced the defenses of the Soviet troops from the border to Tula and unsuccessfully stormed the defending city.
Heinz Guderian visited our country before the war as an inspector of tank troops. He checked the combat readiness of German tankers in ... Kazan. Yes, it was.
German tankers were trained in Kazan when, after the First World War, Germany was forbidden to have armed forces.
Guderian was independent. However, he was loved by Hitler. Both the direction of the strike and the candidacy of the commander of the troops were approved.
By mid-October 1941, it became clear to the Nazi command that the goals set by the Barbarossa plan had not been achieved. The tank grouping of Colonel General Erich Gepner, who was ordered to bypass Moscow and block it along the Vladimir-Suzdal line, was forced to engage in battles in the Kaluga direction.
The plans of the tank group of Heinz Guderian also fell through. On October 10, his tanks were supposed to roll through the streets of Arzamas, and after five days they would enter Gorky, which had been crushed by massive air strikes, and, without hesitation, rush to join Gepner. So, according to the plan, the ring around Moscow was closed.
Meanwhile, Guderian was still standing near Tula. His tank army was melting under the blows of the "selective raids" of the Soviet troops. The victorious ardor of the "tank king" noticeably diminished. He understood that the upcoming winter could be restless for him: he could be driven on the offensive.
He writes to his wife: “Only the one who saw the endless expanses of Russian snows this winter of our misfortune and felt the piercing icy wind burying everything in its path in the snow, who, hour after hour, drove cars along no man’s land to arrive at a miserable dwelling along with underdressed, half-starved people can fairly judge the events that have taken place.
And this is only about the beginning of the most severe of all war winters. The war according to the third option clearly did not work out.
Meanwhile, in this "space of Russian snows" with a piercing icy wind, 350 thousand Gorky residents were digging a ditch, which was supposed to stop Guderian's tanks. The pamphlet The Enemy Will Not Pass, published following the construction of the defense line, noted that the volume of earthworks carried out at the construction of the defense line "accounts for 60 percent of the earthworks of the Stalin White Sea-Baltic Canal and 75 percent of the work of the Ferghana Canal."
For many years almost nothing was known about this construction. Yes, at the level of rumors. Until recently, all documents relating to these works were marked with the stamp: “Owls. secret."
The time has come to tell how the defensive line around Gorky was built, and let those who had this hard work do it.
“I got to the labor front, as the digging of an anti-tank ditch was then called, back in September 1941. School had just begun, and two weeks later, our entire ninth grade at the Naumovskaya secondary school in the Buturlinsky district was mobilized.
The collection was appointed in Buturlin. Brigades were formed here, brigadiers were appointed. The provision of food and all maintenance fell on the local collective farms.
And so the convoy, about two kilometers long, headed for Knyaginino, from there to Lyskovo, then there was a crossing over the Volga and we stopped in the village of Valki. There our work began.
An anti-tank ditch was dug perpendicular to the river. We worked until the Volga got up.
During this time, a German plane flew twice. He did not bomb, did not shoot, apparently, he only photographed what we had dug up.
Then we were transferred to Bolshoe Murashkino, here, near the village of Rozhdestveno, there was also an anti-tank ditch. The cold came, the ground froze, picks, crowbars, shovels did not take it. Then the frozen earth began to blow up. I was given a horse with a sleigh, and I carried explosives - ammonal, which was packed in paper bags of 40 kilograms.
Sappers blew up in the morning. We were forced to hide in dugouts, but how to appease boyish curiosity: we managed to look at the explosions, risking falling under a hail of clods of frozen earth. Explosions did not make our work easier. Pieces of fallen earth still had to be hollowed out.
When severe colds set in, they began to give us 100 grams of vodka each - “People's Commissar's”.
When the fascists were driven away from Moscow, discipline at the site began to weaken.
Once the women persuaded me to take them home. We left at night. Nobody even missed us. We never returned to the trenches. Yes, it was already clear that the need for them had disappeared.
Alexander Pavlovich Kochetov (village of Inkino, Buturlinsky district).
“In 1941 I graduated from the 10th grade of the secondary Bogorodsk school. On June 19 we had a graduation party, and three days later the war began ...
Summons for the construction of the defense line or, as they said then, "to the trenches" were handed to us at the end of October. I was only 17 years old.
70 people were mobilized from our village Alisteeva. In total, 12 carts were equipped and we were taken with knapsacks to the village of Migalikha, Dalnekonstantinovsky district. We drove through Oranki, past Shonikha ...
In Migalikha we were resettled at home. I heard that they also lived in huts, so we were well arranged. We worked here for about ten days, and then again the road. We drove for a long time, all night. Where they were going, no one knew. By morning we were in the village of Arapiha. And again we were arranged for housing in houses of 5-6 people. And the owners themselves have large families. Tight, but at least warm.
Winter was early that year. Snowless, and frosts have already struck. In the morning for thirty cold.
They gave us bast shoes. They said it was the best shoe. Indeed, walking in them was easy and warm.
I never wore bast shoes, I couldn’t put on the right shoes so that they don’t get loose. For a week women shod me, but I never learned how to wind onuchi and tie bast shoes. Then they gave me chesanki with galoshes. I immediately felt a load on my legs. By evening, I was rubbing my legs to the blood.
I had to walk three kilometers to get to work. Exactly at 7 o'clock in the morning they began to work, and finished when it got dark. They came back a little alive. They slept on mattresses stuffed with straw.
We dug an anti-tank ditch. One side of the ditch, the one where the fascist tanks were waiting for, was gentle, and the opposite side was sheer. The depth of the ditch was 4 meters. The tanks could easily drive into the ditch, but immediately ran into an earthen wall. They couldn't climb the wall.
Pillboxes, bunkers, machine-gun nests, dugouts and dugouts were built along the entire line of the moat. The roads were blocked by concrete gouges and iron "hedgehogs".
I remember that they fed us normally. Didn't feel hungry. The first courses were almost always meat. They brought us food from our collective farm, sent something from home.
And everything would be fine, but we were overcome by lice. Our heads were like ant heaps, our hair was moving. They didn’t let us go home to fry our clothes in the bathhouse, but here nothing was done to fight this infection. They said to be patient. We endured...
But one day this patience came to an end. It was already in January 1942. That's how much they endured. We decided to voluntarily leave the place of work and go home. At night they took off and walked along the lights from village to village. We were advised to go to the railroad and walk along it. We did just that. During the day they were at home.
Fearing that they would come for us, they quickly heated the bath at home so that we could wash ourselves. But no one came for us and demanded to return. The rest arrived a few days later. They reported that an order had come to stop the construction of the defense line. The need for it disappeared, the enemy was turned away from Moscow.
There are only three witnesses of those days left in our village. The boys that were with us then went to the front and did not return. Those who were older died long ago. And we were the youngest...
That's all the memory has. They say that youth does not notice difficulties. It probably happened to me too. I may have forgotten about the most difficult and bitter. I wrote what I remember.
Maria Nikolaevna Topkova (village Laksha, Bogorodsky district).
“My mother worked at the defensive structures for almost three months. She has been dead for a long time. And I was then 14 years old, I had just finished a seven-year school, and my older sister - a ten-year one.
In the fall, all childless men and women who were not drafted into the army received summons to build defensive lines. The summons was also brought to my older sister. Mom began to cry, and the next day she went to the collective farm board and asked to be sent to work.
We also had a sister in our family. She just turned two years old. It was hard for my mother to leave the house.
How long this autumn and winter lasted! With riders, our mothers sent notes and asked them to send them new bast shoes. We went to the neighboring village, bought bast shoes there and sent them away.
I remember that my mother worked near the village of Shonikha.
In mid-January, there was a knock on the window at night. We didn’t have light, I went out onto the porch and asked: “Who is there?” It was our mother. We did not immediately recognize her ... Her face is black, frostbitten. She was tall, plump, and here she was thin, almost an old woman.
When they were told that the work was completed, they immediately went home, and this is a hundred kilometers in the cold.
Later, in peacetime, I often asked my mother about that work, but she kept saying only one thing: “Lord, let me forget about these trenches.”
Lidia Grigorievna Mukhina (Myshlyaeva) (village of Kostyanka, Shatkovsky district).
“I will never forget the night of November 4-5, 1941. Several people ran up to us at the foremen's apartment at once: “Let's go, see how Gorky is on fire!”
We ran outside and saw a terrible picture. The sky in Gorky's direction was all crimson. Beams of searchlights were visible, which snatched flying planes out of the darkness.
Someone said that they were bombing a car factory. We stood in a daze for a long time. Although we were building a defense line, but, judging by the map, the war was far from us, and we could not believe that it would come to us. Over the near fields, wave after wave of German bombers marched towards Gorky. Our teacher Petr Ivanovich Kaistinen was evacuated from Petrozavodsk. He said that he had already seen and heard German bombers.
And on the morning of November 5, an emergency occurred. When the foremen and construction managers, after a short meeting, went to work, they did not find anyone on the defensive line line. The ground, as if with snow, was covered with white leaflets. Holding up a few of them, we read: “If you come to dig trenches tomorrow, we will bomb you!”
The horror of the evening spectacle also affected. The teachers were frightened and, having taken the students, went home.
What to do? The representative of the district party committee, Konstantin Sergeevich Mishin, calmly said: “We will not panic. The district committee of the party is probably already aware of the state of emergency. Now collect the leaflets and burn them." So we did.
By evening, the head of the district department of the NKVD arrived from Bolshoy Murashkin. On the way, he gave the order to appear to all the brigadiers at the headquarters. One was supposed to go.
In the corridor, all the male brigadiers began to quietly beg me to go to the head of the first. You are, they say, a woman, a school principal, and nothing will happen to you, and the boss will become softer.
What to do, maybe they are right. Trying to be calm, she came in ... I still can't forget it.
Hello! Hello! Where are the students?
He listened to me without interrupting, looking straight ahead. Then he ordered: “I give you 48 hours to return the students. If you don't return, I'll shoot you." And he took out a revolver from the desk drawer ...
I walked to the door on shaky legs, trying not to fall. The brigadiers surrounded me. I managed to tell them that they promised to return people to the border.
Zoya Ivanovna Petrova (Sabanova) (settlement of Bolshoe Murashkino).
“We walked in silence. Everyone's heart was in pain. We knew that the situation at the front was bad. Occupying and ruining our cities and villages, the enemy got closer and closer to Moscow.
Vityusha, you are literate. high school finished today. Tell me, will the fascists win us? - Asked me, breaking the general silence, Uncle Fyodor Salnikov, an elderly man who was part of the brigade along with his sons Evstafiy and Nikolai.
Never, never,” I replied vehemently. - There were many hunters before the Russian land. And they were all defeated. And the German knights, and the Swedes, and the Poles, invincible Napoleon. And the same thing awaits the Nazis. There will be a holiday on our street.
Yes, God, - sighed Uncle Fyodor.
In the village where we came, we were billeted. The hostess brought us an armful of straw from the yard, spread it on the floor, covered it with some kind of sackcloth, and said bitterly:
There is nothing more. Sorry for bad reception.
Nothing, not bars, - they answered her. - Thanks for that too. We leave the land, we will fall asleep and so on. If only it were warm.
In the morning it was a little light, after a quick snack, we went to work. We had to walk three kilometers. Approaching the place, from a steep slope they saw: everywhere, as far as the eye could see, excavators were working. Our team immediately got to work. The earth froze to a great depth. Frozen ground was even sawn with a saw.
Without holidays, without days off, in the bitter cold, people gave their all to work. They returned to the apartments barely dragging their feet. They ate hot only in the morning and in the evening. Dinner was replaced by a piece of rye bread frozen in an icicle in your pocket. He did not thaw even by the fire - the top burned, and ice remained inside.
When they learned about the defeat of the Germans near Moscow, there was no limit to the general rejoicing.
Well, Uncle Fyodor, - I said triumphantly, - the holiday begins in our street.
Uncle Fyodor wiped his tears with his mitten.
But the general joy and celebration was still far away. In the first days of January, summonses came to the track. I still had a whole war ahead of me ... "
Viktor Nikolaevich Zimin (Kstovo).
On January 14, 1942, a special commission signed an act on the acceptance of defensive structures around Gorky, noting the high quality of the work performed.
Returning from the line of defense, its builders adopted an appeal to all the working people of the region:
“Our construction was a school of labor and courage. Genuine heroes of the labor front have grown up in our ranks.
We are returning from the frontier to our usual work in the days when the heroic Red Army strikes blow after blow against the hated enemy, destroying his manpower and equipment, freeing his native land from dirty fascist invaders. But the enemy is not completely destroyed.
... We must ... transfer our combat experience gained in the construction of a defensive line to workshops and collective farms, enterprises and institutions in order to help the front with even greater force, help the Red Army exterminate the hated Nazi invaders, liberate our cities and villages from brown beasts."
In the summer of 1942, when the Nazi troops launched an offensive in the bend of the Don, the danger of a strategic breakthrough to Penza - Saransk - Arzamas arose again. Earthworks at the line of defense continued, but were already less significant.
The Tannenberg line is a complex of German defensive structures in Estonia on the Narva Isthmus between the Gulf of Finland and Lake Peipsi. The name of the line, according to the ideas of the propagandists of the Third Reich, was supposed to support the weakened morale of the German troops: in the battle of Tannenberg during the East Prussian operation of 1914, two corps of the 2nd Army of Russia under the command of General Samsonov were surrounded and defeated.
Back in the summer of 1943, the Germans began to strengthen the defensive line along the Narova River, giving it the code name "Panther". Retreating from Leningrad, the Germans occupied the Panther defense line, but rather quickly lost their positions, on June 26, 1944 they occupied the Tannenberg line, the defense line of which included the Vaivara Blue Mountains. The wooded, swampy Narva Isthmus, in itself, was a serious obstacle to the advancement of troops and military equipment. Reinforced with military engineering structures and firepower, it became almost impregnable.
The frontier consisted of three lines of a defensive line with a total length of 55 km and a depth of up to 25-30 km. The first strip of this line ran from the village of Mummasaare, located on the shores of the Gulf of Finland, along the three heights of the Blue Mountains through the strongholds of Sirgala, Putki, Gorodenka and further along the Narova River to Lake Peipus. The basis of the defense was the Blue Mountains, 3.4 km long, which consisted of three heights: Tower Mountain, 70 m high, Grenadier Mountain, 83 m high and Parkovaya Mountain, 85 m high. All three mountains had a dominant position in the surrounding their locality.
The first military installations were built on three, then nameless heights under Peter I, during the Great Northern War with the Swedes. They were built to protect the rear of the army during the assault on Narva. At the beginning of the 20th century, the heights with the battery placed there were included in the coastal defense system. Russian Empire. Passages were cut inside the mountains for the delivery of ammunition and reserves. The firing points and strong points were connected by underground communications. German troops used a system of ready-made underground structures, adapting and rebuilding everything to fit their needs. The reliability of the Tannenberg line was personally checked by Himmler.
Taking into account the fact that on one side there were impenetrable swamp forests with Lake Peipus, and on the other - the Gulf of Finland, the Germans considered the defense line an insurmountable natural barrier for the Red Army units advancing from the east.
Along the defense line in the settlements, several parallel trenches of a full profile were dug, sheathed with logs and poles. The trenches were reinforced with dugouts and bunkers, as well as open and semi-open firing points. In wetlands, instead of trenches, fortifications were built from logs on wooden decks. In front of the first line of trenches were several rows of barbed wire, Bruno's spirals and minefields. Behind the trenches, in the depths of the defense, reinforced concrete and wood-and-earth shelters were placed to shelter troops. The defenses in the Blue Mountains were reinforced by artillery positions, armored Crab-type machine gun nests, and tanks dug into the ground. The deep caves on the heights that have existed since the time of Peter the Great were turned by the Germans into bomb shelters and shelters for guns. The trenches climbed the slopes in winding labyrinths, connected at the top with casemates that hid long-range artillery. The stone buildings of the children's colony that once existed here were rebuilt into nests for firing points. The foundations of buildings have been converted into massive pillboxes. Headquarters and reserves were located on the slopes of the heights, in the bunkers. North and south of the heights were the main communications - Railway and highways that led deep into Estonia and allowed the Germans to maneuver troops.
The second defensive line of the Tannenberg line ran along the Sytka River from Sillamäe in the direction of Van-Sytka through Sirgala to the south. The third lane was 25 kilometers from the main one and ran from the Gulf of Finland through settlements Kukkvhvrya, Suur - Konyu, Moonaküla, Oru Yaam and further along the shore of Lake Peenjare.
On July 24, 1945, the troops of the left flank of the Leningrad Front, having launched the Narva offensive operation, having liberated the city of Narva, ran into the Tannenberg defensive line and were forced to start a fierce assault on the fortifications from July 27 until August 10, after which they went on the defensive. Against units of the 2nd and 8th Soviet armies, with a total number of 57 thousand people, fought the 3rd German SS armored corps, with a total number of 50 thousand people. Estonians, Danes, Norwegians, Swedes, Dutch, Belgians, Flemings, Finns and representatives of other peoples who volunteered to join the SS fought on the side of the Germans. Having failed to break through the defenses in the forehead for two weeks, the Soviet command, according to the plan of the Tallinn offensive operation, abandoned the assault on the Tannenberg line and from September 3 secretly began the transfer of troops of the 2nd shock army to the southwestern coast of Lake Peipus, to the line of the river Emajõgi, to strike at the line from the rear. The transfer of troops was timely detected by the enemy, and on September 16, Hitler signed an order to withdraw troops from Estonia to Latvia. On the same day, the Germans, without announcing the order, began to evacuate their units. The Estonian units were informed about Hitler's order almost two days late. They were supposed to cover the general withdrawal of the German units and leave the Blue Mountains on the morning of September 19, 1944. However, the Estonians "ahead of schedule" and already on September 18 left their positions.
During the fighting, the losses of the German side amounted to about 10 thousand people, incl. 2.5 thousand Estonians. The Red Army lost a little less than 5 thousand people. The discrepancy between the losses of the attackers and the defenders of the prevailing proportion is explained by the significant superiority of the Red Army in aviation and artillery. On average, from 1 to 3 thousand shells and mines of various calibers fell on the positions of the Germans per day of the offensive. For two weeks, attack aircraft and bombers made about a thousand sorties. According to eyewitnesses, the Blue Mountains were turned into a continuous conflagration, plowed up with heavy shells to a depth of 2-3 meters. Only 10-15 years after the war, the first sprouts of trees began to appear there. Therefore, German losses would have been many times greater if they had not been saved by countless caste caves adapted for shelters and shelters.
The Tannenberg line was one of the smallest German defensive structures in length in the entire history of World War II and the only one that the Red Army could not take, although it suffered very serious material and human losses. Thus, the Tannenberg defensive line is one of the few German fortifications that has fully completed its task, and even with minimal capital investment.
MILITARY THOUGHT No. 4/1994
Capture of intermediate defensive lines of the enemy
ColonelYu.V.IGNATOV
The problem of capturing the enemy's defensive lines first arose during the Second World War, when in the course of offensive and counter-offensive operations it was necessary to quickly break down his defenses, hastily created in depth.
During the Great Patriotic War, this problem was mainly solved by the use of armored, mechanized, airborne, aviation formations and formations, the consistency of their use in operations, as well as a significant increase in the range of fire on the enemy. Conditions conducive to capture arose most often after the troops of the front had broken through the tactical defense zone of the Germans and the development of the offensive. This was explained by the fact that by the beginning of counter-offensive operations, the enemy was usually in a transitional (from offensive to defensive) grouping and had a dense operational formation of troops, and his unused reserves were close to the army corps of the first echelon. Thus, up to 80 - 90% of the forces and means turned out to be in the tactical defense zone, and it was there that the system of fire and obstacles was created. In the depths of the defense, advantageous lines, if they were prepared, were not engaged in troops. Therefore, the rapid overcoming of the tactical zone contributed to the entry of the troops of the fronts into the operational space, which not only largely determined the success of the operation, but also created the conditions for capturing subsequent defensive lines on the move, since the enemy had neither the time nor the strength to create a stable defense.
IN offensive operations after breaking through the tactical defense zone of the Germans, our troops repeatedly had to overcome the system of their intermediate defensive lines. Due to the significant length of the front line and the general lack of forces and means, these lines in the operational depth, as a rule, were occupied only in the course of a defensive battle by retreating units and reserves that came up from the depths or were transferred from other sectors. A similar situation took place in the Belorussian operation (1944) in the offensive zone of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian fronts (Minsk region). Behind the main line of their defense, the Germans prepared four intermediate lines with a depth of 3 to 7 km each, on which they planned to stop our troops. However, the decisive, maneuverable actions of the fronts did not allow the enemy to occupy them in a timely manner. Therefore, the defense was notable for the insufficient organization of the fire system, reduced stability, the absence of strong reserves and second echelons, the different saturation density of combat formations with manpower and firepower, and the presence of unoccupied sectors. This made it possible, having a 2-fold superiority in forces and means (in the zones of operations of strike groups), to quickly overcome such defensive lines on the move, on a wide front, without complex regroupings, to save reserves for the further development of the offensive, and also to achieve the goals of the operation in more short time and with less losses.
Under modern conditions, in the course of a counteroffensive operation, the situation in which the capture of intermediate defensive lines in depth can be carried out will largely depend on how successfully the enemy's tactical zone (forward defensive line) can be overcome. The experience of the latest exercises has shown that the enemy will seek to stop the advancing troops, inflict defeat on them and create conditions for the continuation of the air-ground operation precisely in the direction of operations of the front's shock groupings. To this end, depending on the depth of penetration, he can take up defensive positions at an intermediate line or hastily move to it and equip a new defensive line in an unplanned area.
If a counter-offensive operation begins with the defeat of an enemy who has been stopped, goes over to the defensive, but has not had time to gain a foothold on the achieved lines, then the conditions conducive to the capture of his subsequent defensive lines can most likely develop when the troops of the front break the enemy’s resistance, overcome the first defensive line and will develop an offensive in depth. In this case, the enemy will try to stop the advance of the front's shock groupings by means of deterrence, withdraw troops, and, having organized a defense based on an intermediate defensive line, disrupt the counteroffensive. The front's task may be to capture this line on the move, frustrate the enemy's plans, and ensure the prescribed rate of advance.
In areas where the enemy has managed to gain a foothold, the counteroffensive operation of the front will apparently begin with a breakthrough of the defense. In such a situation, the capture of intermediate defensive lines is possible after the defeat of the main forces of the army corps of the first echelon and the entry of troops into the operational space.
The operational situation may also develop in such a way that a counteroffensive operation begins with the development of army or frontal counterattacks. Under these conditions, on the axes of strikes, the troops of the front can cut through the unprepared tactical defense and create a threat of encirclement of the army corps of the first echelon. In order to stop the groupings that have broken through, the enemy will probably be forced to hastily create defensive lines on threatened axes. At the same time, the troops of the front can be assigned the task of seizing these lines on the move, gaining a foothold on them and, having increased their efforts, continue the counteroffensive.
Conditions for capture may arise during a counter-offensive against a withdrawing enemy, when he will seek to prevent the advance of the front's troops by holding actions in order to gain time for the withdrawal of his troops to a line advantageous for defense. The task of the front or the army (AK) will be to prevent the detachment of the enemy troops, forestall him in reaching an advantageous line and capture him before the reserves approach.
The most favorable situation is when the enemy is forced to hastily take up defensive positions on an unprepared line and in unfavorable conditions (after an unsuccessful oncoming battle or counterattack, when trying to avoid defeat by going over to the defensive in order to cover the flanks), as well as when encirclement is threatened.
Thus, in the course of a counteroffensive operation of the front, the capture of defensive lines is possible in areas where the enemy did not have time to create a defense due to lack of time, and also if the defense is occupied on a wide front with a lack of forces and means.
Studies show that in a modern large-scale or regional war, by the time the front troops go on a counteroffensive, the enemy, trying to defeat them in a short time, apparently, due to his initial superiority, will not pay due attention to creating defensive lines in depth. Most likely, he will begin the transition from offensive to defensive, having an offensive formation of troops. Under such conditions, there will be no classical defense formation. According to the views of US military experts, during the transition from offensive to defensive, it is planned to organize and conduct it in accordance with Field Manual FM 100-5 and NATO Allied Forces Manual ATP-35 A, if a further offensive becomes impossible due to large losses, vulnerability of communications, or it is necessary to repel counteroffensive (counterattack) of a large enemy grouping. The decisive factor in organizing such a defense is time.
This can be confirmed by NATO’s Zima-83, -85, -87, -89 Joint Forces command post exercise, the Serten Shield-91 NATO Joint Forces exercise, at which, among other issues, the statutory provisions relating to the organization of hostilities at intermediate defensive lines were checked. It was planned that the first intermediate defensive line, if necessary, could be defended both by reserves and by the second echelons of army corps. The subsequent intermediate defensive lines were to be occupied as needed. The defense on them was not continuous - significant gaps were allowed between divisions, and the divisions themselves along the front occupied strips that exceeded the standards. Intermediate defensive lines can be set up deliberately and involuntarily in one (the most dangerous) or simultaneously in several directions of operations of the front troops (in most of the counteroffensive zone), in a previously planned area or in a new one, in front of important military and economic objects, as well as on barrier lines.
Based on the conclusions of military experts from developed countries regarding the organization of defense, they can be taken as a guideline for further presentation of the material.
The results of modeling the counteroffensive operation of the front show that such lines can be defended by the forces of 2-3 or more reserve divisions or by a consolidated group of approximately the same composition, formed from reserve and outgoing formations (units) of operational formations. The purpose of creating such lines, apparently, will depend on the conditions of the situation, the terrain, the operational equipment of the combat area, the condition of the troops and may be as follows: to prevent the capture of operationally or economically important objects and areas in the depths of one's defense; stop the advance of enemy troops in one or more directions; create a new defense system based on an intermediate defensive line; to prevent the environment of any grouping; cover the area in which troops are concentrated for a counterattack; prevent a sudden blow to the flank of their counterstrike grouping; prohibit the entry of the second echelon of the front; to force the advancing troops to move in a direction favorable to them, etc. In this regard, the need to capture each defensive line will pursue quite specific goals. For example, they may consist in ensuring high rates of counteroffensive, capturing important enemy military installations, economic regions, communication centers, violating his plans to create a new defense system based on an intermediate line or withdrawing troops from a semi-encirclement, which will require the involvement of a certain detachment of forces and means, the use of special methods of troop action and fire engagement of the enemy.
The nature of modern operations allows us to put forward the assumption that not all troops of the front will participate in the capture of the listed defensive lines of the enemy, but only those formations in whose direction of action these lines will arise. They can be an army, an army corps, several divisions (brigades). The troops of the front with the means of support and reinforcement allocated for the period of capture can be called a capture grouping, the period of operation of which is limited by the time it takes to complete the task. If it is necessary to capture several lines in succession, then the capture grouping will continue operations in the same or changed composition (depending on the situation) until the appropriate order. It is advisable to entrust the control of the capture grouping to that commander (commander), whose formation (combination) forms its basis, and if several formations participate in the capture, then to one of the deputy commanders of the front troops.
When a defensive line is captured, the troops advance towards it in the designated lanes and in a previously created operational formation.
The scheme of actions of the group in question may be as follows. First, fire strikes are delivered against enemy troops retreating, going over to the defensive, and approaching the defensive line. Then the forward and raid detachments, in cooperation with the landing troops, sabotage, reconnaissance and airmobile groups, with the support of artillery and aviation, seize the most advantageous sectors, unoccupied areas, key objects, disrupting the control, tactical and fire communications of the enemy. Subsequently, the main forces of the formations of the first echelon, using the success of the air-ground echelon, expand the captured areas in depth, towards the flanks and take possession of the entire frontier. At the same time, the most mobile units, without waiting for the complete defeat of the enemy on the defensive line, continue to perform further tasks.
Experience suggests that in order to ensure the success of capturing a defensive line, even before going over to the attack, it is necessary: to deprive the enemy of an influx of reserves; block his escape route; by inflicting fire and electronic strikes on command posts and long-range fire weapons to deprive the enemy command of the ability to control its troops, maneuver and carry out fire impact on advancing capture groupings. Naturally, the fulfillment of these tasks is directly dependent on the availability of the necessary outfit of reconnaissance, fire, strike forces and means, their capabilities to detect and destroy launchers, anti-tank weapons systems, aviation, enemy hands, as well as conditions conducive to the capture of defensive lines.
The terms of preparation for the capture are limited by the time of overcoming the inter-border space (40 - 60 km). Therefore, it is necessary to start it as early as possible, i.e. in the course of overcoming the first (previous) defensive line, and to complete - before the transition of the formations of the first echelon to the attack. Moreover, this time should be less than the time spent by the enemy on organizing a stable defense. In this case, you can count on success.
The quality and timeliness of training are directly dependent on the effectiveness of the methods used and the ability of commanders (commanders) and staffs to carry out the necessary preparatory measures within a limited period of time and at the same time control troops in a dynamic counteroffensive situation. This, in turn, necessitates more flexible planning and involves finding ways to reduce the time for the entire preparatory cycle, which is permissible with full use of the capabilities of the ACCS and improving the skills of front officials in commanding subordinate troops.
The flexibility of planning lies in the development of several options for completing the task. Any action plan must be thought out in detail so that one of its options is sure to succeed.
In our opinion, it is expedient, in our opinion, to create a 2-3-fold superiority over the enemy in areas for the capture of divisions. To do this, according to the existing methodology, calculate their number, width and depth.
There are various options for capturing, depending on the scale of the operation, the condition of the troops of the parties, the situation that has developed in one direction or another, and the characteristics of the defensive line - the length, depth, degree of employment and readiness of the defense, as well as the moral and psychological state of the enemy troops. Let's consider some of them.
First. The divisions of the first echelon of the capture group, each advancing in its own direction, seize individual sectors on the defensive line. Initially, gaps are allowed between them, which, due to expansion towards the sides of the flanks and depth, are combined. The capture of the frontier is carried out until the complete defeat of the enemy.
Second. The capture of a defensive line is carried out in the counteroffensive zone of an operational or operational-tactical formation of the first echelon, corresponding to the efforts of two or three divisions (brigades) in one direction, the expansion of the capture area is carried out by flank divisions.
Third. The capture is carried out in the direction of the main strike of the operational-strategic formation with the formation of a capture area on the adjacent flanks of the formations advancing side by side.
It should be emphasized that various combinations of the listed options are possible.
Troop actions to seize intermediate lines should be based on: highly maneuverable actions of troops, forces and means, combined with continuous fire impact throughout the entire depth of the enemy's operational formation; suddenness; preemption in delivering strikes and actions of troops; reliable fire damage and electronic suppression of objects of the opposing group; disorganization of management at an early stage; isolation of the battlefield from the influx of reserves; defeating the enemy piecemeal and creating an active front of struggle in his rear (airborne assault forces, airmobile groups, formations and units operating in isolation from the main forces and remaining in the occupied territory). In addition, it is necessary to provide for measures to combat the enemy's WTO and RUK (ROK) and to protect friendly troops from massive fire strikes and air attack weapons.
Let's briefly dwell on the advantages of capture. First, it is carried out on the move, on a broad front, along the lines of action of divisions (brigades) of the first echelon by those groupings that were created before going over to the counteroffensive. Secondly, in the areas of capture, a lesser superiority in forces and means is created than in the areas of breakthrough, and the areas of capture themselves are 2-3 times wider than the areas of breakthrough. Third, in the course of the capture, the troops not only take possession of the territory defended by the enemy, but also smash him on it, preventing a retreat from their positions. There are differences in the preparation of a breakthrough and capture. If the preparation of the first is carried out mainly in a static state, then the preparation of the second, as a rule, is in the process of advancing front troops to the next defensive line with constant fire contact with the retreating enemy.
In conclusion, we note that with the capture of each defensive line, the integrity of the enemy defense system is violated. The defeat of the defending formations reduces its overall combat potential by an appropriate share. This helps to increase the pace of advance, reduce losses, complete the operation in a shorter time, and, consequently, makes a significant contribution to increasing the effectiveness of the counteroffensive.
We are talking about lines in the depth of the operational formation, designed to organize defense on them by retreating formations and units, as well as operational reserves.
military thought. - 1992. -№2. - P.40 - 41.
Strategic essay on the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. - M.: Military Publishing House, 1961.- S.312-313.
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The artillery nine-gun ship battery of special purpose "A" ("Aurora") was formed by order of the commander of the naval defense of Leningrad and the lake district, Rear Admiral K. I. Samoilov dated July 08, 1941, No. 013. In general, a separate artillery division was formed special purpose two-battery composition. The division consisted of a battery "A" - "Aurora" (on the Dudergof heights, guns 130-mm / 55 type BS-13-1S (the first series of guns, produced in the USSR until 1939) and "B" - "Bolshevik" (on Pulkovo heights, guns of 130 mm/55 guns of the B-13-2S type (second series, from 1939).
Seven battery guns (130/55) were removed from the Aurora cruiser and moved to the foothills of the Orekhovaya and Kirchhoff mountains, two guns (130/55) were also removed from the cruiser and installed behind the Kiev highway. The personnel of battery "A" consisted of sailors of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, from the cruiser "Aurora", and other ships and units that were part of the MOL and OR. 5 gun commanders of the battery were graduates of the Higher Naval School. P. S. Nakhimov in Sevastopol, sent after graduation to Leningrad. The commanders of the artillery division Ivanov D.N. and Mikhailov M.A. were graduates of the Sevastopol Naval Artillery School of Coastal Defense. LKSMU, 40th and 39th years, respectively.
On August 28, 1941, battery "A" (and "B") entered into active fighting, opening fire on distant targets near Gatchina. After the Germans broke through the Krasnogvardeisky fortified area, on September 11, 1941, in an unequal battle with units of the 1st Panzer and 36th Infantry Divisions Nazi Germany, battery "A", fighting to the last shell, died. The guns were either blown up or damaged. The captured 4th gun was destroyed by the return fire of the battery. Several seriously wounded Red Navy soldiers were executed. The last guns (8 and 9), being at some distance from the enemy, fired at the enemy until the morning of September 13, 1941, until the limit of shells was exhausted, after which the gun aiming devices were destroyed, and their calculations retreated to Pulkovo, to the battery " B". Under the cover of the 8th and 9th guns, thousands of refugees from the territories occupied as a result of the breakthrough of the front were able to leave Leningrad Leningrad region. The remnants of the surviving batteries replenished the personnel of the battery "B" ("Bolshevik") in Pulkovo. On September 30, 1941, battery "A", as a "dead soul", by order No. 0084 of the commander of the Leningrad Front Zhukov G.K., among others, was transferred to the Leningrad Front and was directly subordinate to the Krasnogvardeisky fortified area.
Differences in dates last day Batteries" are due to the fact that the main battles of Battery "A" fell on September 11th. On this day, most of its personnel and guns died, an execution took place, and the soldiers of the surrounded guns blew themselves up. In general, out of 164 people of the first composition, on September 12, 96 people remained alive, together with the personal and commander. composition (it should be taken into account that these people from September 13, 1941 continued fighting as part of the battery "B" ("Bolshevik") of the artillery division).
The date of the cessation of the last hostilities of the Aurora battery as part of a separate special-purpose artillery battalion of a two-battery composition is the morning of September 13, 1941.
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